Winter War Diaries

[Gytis]

A big fighting is coming soon. Its good. You had to many vacations during last week (bah, only bombers and fighters). You have war going on. So we want blood! BLOOD!

[Math Guy]

Nov 25 39

Once again the Red Air Force declared a "vacation day" and failed to make an appearance. With so many attack groups operating, it seemed very unlikely to the High Command that this was due to random chance. Possibly our AA fire was wearing down Soviet organization faster than we thought.

Note: Or possibly there is some significance in the fact that these "vacations" always happen on the first day after a save and reload. I will investigate further.

Nov 26 39

Air attacks resumed with their usual fury. Recent comments in the Lithuanian press (!) that the war in Finland wasn't "real" and that nothing but "a few fighters and bombers" were being lost, evoked bitter laughter among the exposed troops at Kajaani. More than 10 % of the Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä had become casualties in the past two weeks. Many frontline positions at Kajaani no longer had any snow on them, having been burned and blasted to bare earth.

However, the day's results were viewed with slightly more enthusiasm by the High Command, as Soviet losses hit a record high.

Kajaani (morning) 700 planes, none lost, 150 to 200 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 400 planes, 14 lost, 50 to 100 casualties
Kajaani (afternoon) 300 planes, 1 lost, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (afternoon) 700 planes, 3 lost, no effect
Viipuri (afternoon) 400 planes, 19 lost

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 2,500, 37 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: about 300 to 400

The sub flotilla again managed to hit a Soviet convoy westbound, sinking one medium-sized freighter. Intelligence had made no progress on the mystery of where the Soviet convoys were going.

Nov 27 39

Yet another lull in the Soviet air offensive occurred (again coinciding with a save and reload). However, the Soviets now had 18 divisions massed directly opposite Viipuri on the outskirts of Leningrad, and more on the way. Time was clearly running out. The first reinforcements reached Kajaani in the early hours of the 27th, and immediately began frantically digging in. Under the heavy bombardment there had been no opportunity for the PSR to create bunkers for the arriving 11th Division to occupy -- and now whether the Red Army, or the Red Air Force, would give the Finns enough time was a question no one could answer.

Nov 28 39

Soviet air power fell in maximum fury on Kajaani, starting before dawn and continuing all day. Unaware of the Finnish troop movements, or unable to alter their plans on short notice, the Red Air Force sent 1,000 planes against the PSR bunker line in the morning and a further 600 in the afternoon, ignoring the exposed 11th Division as they hacked slit trenches in frozen soil, or piled rocks and filled sandbags to build sangars. Again, as on so many days during this war, Finnish losses were heavy -- between 150 and 200 from the morning raid. But using the added firepower of the 11th Division, the AA coordinator managed to bring down 5 raiders, a record for Kajaani.

Elsewhere the Soviets experienced little success.

Joensuu (morning) 400 planes, none lost, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 200 planes, 17 lost
Joensuu (afternoon) 950 planes, 3 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,150, 25 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: about 250 to 300

Because of the suddenness of the outbreak of war, newspaper reporters were only now reaching the battlefront. An American correspondent touring the positions of the PSR during a brief noon lull in bombing asked General Pajari, in command of what was now VII Corps, what sort of defense line he planned to construct that would hold back a dozen or more Soviet divisions.

"We're calling it Mannerheim East," Pajari replied. "It will be very formidable."

"But what can you build with, here in the wilderness? You can't pour concrete in winter . . . you barely have any sleds to haul lumber, trucks can't go anywhere off the main road . . ."

"Bah, lumber!" Pajari smiled. "We have everything we need to construct a splendid fortress -- our sisu, our shovels, and a steady supply of Soviet aircraft parts, delivered by air."

[Math Guy]

Germany's campaign against France seemed to have stalled in the past week, with no changes in the front line.

Italy had launched a highly successful invasion in the south, taking Grenoble, Toulon, and Marseilles, but had suffered a reverse in North Africa. After encircling Tobruk, the Italian colonial army drove into Egypt and took Sidi Barrani -- but when the British launched a breakout from Tobruk and recaptured Bir El Hakim, the Italians were themselves pocketed.

The war in China was also not going well for Nationalist and Communist China, united against Japan. They had lost a half-dozen provinces just since September 1939.

14-20 Nov 39
9,450 Soviet sorties, 76 aircraft shot down
up to 1,400 Finnish casualties

21-27 Nov 39
9,850 Soviet sorties, 96 aircraft shot down
up to 1,500 Finnish casualties

[Frankie]

Sisu! That's the way to go...

[Alexandru H.]

It looks like you still have the upper hand...

[Dalwin]

I had wondered the same thing about the lack of Finnish fighter planes. They were never many but they were not nonexistant.

Also, one way to rectify the sorty count to be more historical is to remember that in real life a squadron will rarely have 100% of it's planes particiapting in a given raid for one mechanical reason or another. The planes and crews are still part of the squadron roster and will fly on on another day but not this particular raid.

In game terms, this loss of firepower is fairly accurately portrayed by lowered org. The actual sorty counts in game are, however, artificially high because it always shows the full sqadron as participating in the raid.

Edit addendum: I understand that a statistical study of things like aircraft casualty rates is part of what you are doing here. The point I raise above might somewhat invalidate your figures. I don't know if you have access to any Soviet aircraft maintenance records for that period as well as the actual casualty records.

I know in other simulations that focused entirely on the air war during WWII it was not unusual to have 20-30% of a squadron held back from the flight line after the first few days of a campaign.

[Math Guy]

Dalwin, nicely said.

I was actually planning to make a very similar kind of argument. I do have operational readiness data for various air forces at various points during the war. Let me give an example.

The Germans had 2,600 aircraft "available" in June 1942, at the start of their second major offensive in the USSR -- meaning that number of aircraft actually existed, and were sitting on runways somewhere near the battle front. Their operational total was closer to 1,600, however, meaning that only 60 to 65 percent of available aircraft could actually fly a mission on any given day. The rest had battle damage, maintenance issues, no ordnance, whatever.

By the late fall, after the Germans had taken Sevastopol and reached the outskirts of Stalingrad and driven into the Caucasus, there were now only 1,600 aircraft "available" and of these, only 600 or so were actually operational. Thus the operational readiness rate had fallen from 60-65 percent to 35-40 percent, and on top of this the raw unit strengths had also fallen dramatically as well.

What would be ideal, in HOI, would be to let the raw strength percentage for each unit represent availability, and then to let some other variable represent operational readiness. The two choices we have for that second variable are org, and "effectivity".

Both are tempting in their own ways, and both have problems.

Org seems like a good choice for two reasons: first, because it has a maximum level, and second, when a unit is at zero org it won't fight, it just retreats or surrenders. So we have the same kind of 0 to 100 range as we see in operational readiness. But org doesn't actually have any impact on HOW a unit fights, so long as it is fighting. This may come as a surprise to many people, because the manual and the rollover text gives the impression org affects combat.

If you have two similar divisions in combat, one with 70 org and the other with 5 org, so long as they are equal in strength and effectivity, the difference in org will not matter. The one with 5 org may retreat sooner, but it will fight at 100 % (as modified by strength and effectivity) until it does. That's clearly not how operational readiness works. Also, high org has rather perverse implications in fighter combat because a fighter with 100+ org may stay in the air, fighting one combat, for DAYS. So org alone isn't the answer.

I had hopes that falling org would have the effect of reducing the sortie rate as the campaign went on. It seems to dramatically reduce strategic bombing sorties in other tests I've done, and if low org results in the planes actually not leaving the ground you've got a much more convincing simulation of lowered operational readiness right there.

But so far there is no sign of that happening to the Red Air Force. The average org level among the attacking planes on the 18th was 24.9, and by the 28th it had risen to 29.3 (remember it was halved when the USSR first declared war). The Finnish AA is doing a good job of slowing down the org increase -- the average would have been at least 40 now if not for AA -- but it's not enough to slow the pace of bombing. Perhaps if fighters were added, or AA boosted, it would be. I have also experimented with drastically lowering the org of fighters, in past tests, and that worked quite well to create more historically realistic behavior.

Effectivity is also a potentially good choice because it actually DOES seem to model lower unit performance. You could imagine the unit leaving a bunch of planes on the runway as it takes off with 50 % effectivity, and the damage inflicted on the enemy would indeed be less, by the right amount. However, effectivity is extremely variable. The Soviet bombing raids in Finland arrive at three in the morning, when it is still dark, and their effectivity is 1 percent. Then when the sun comes up for the final 2-3 hours of bombing, effectivity jumps to 79 percent. So which rate represents the actual number of planes over the target? Also, in the strategic bombing war, the very low level of night bombing effectivity is definitely NOT related to the number of planes -- the whole point is that hundreds of planes are bombing the target, in the dark, but they're missing it.

We can think of certain elements of effectivity as being directly related to operational readiness, for example if you had a tech called "Improved Cold Start Engine Tech" and it added +5 % to effectivity in winter weather. But you can't view the entire effectivity variable as working that way, or then all the other tactical effects of weather and leadership aren't represented, and operational readiness doesn't work at all the way it did in real life.

What this leaves is the approach you suggested . . . when an air unit with 100 % strength goes on a mission, this is deemed in the basic design framework to actually represent only X % of its planes, X being the average operational readiness. The tricky part is what number to assign to X. I'd like to use 50 %, at least as a first approximation, because it's simple, and because most air forces tended to oscillate around that number, being higher at the start of a campaign, and lower at the end.

And THAT is one of the reasons why I'm running this campaign -- to see how far the Soviets exceed their historical performance, and whether 50 % will work. So if they manage to fly 88,000 sorties in 105 days, we can say that two HOI-sorties (two missions by an air wing at 100 % strength) represent one real-life sortie, and that average operational readiness is 50 %.

Then units with high org, and advantageous effectivity bonuses, can be understood as having 60 % or 70 % operational readiness, and units with low org and penalties will have 30 % or 40 %. It will all work in a very literal way, with fewer planes leaving the ground when org is low, and the planes being less effective on arrival because their maintenance is incomplete, they're patched-up and unreliable, and so on.

Alas, right now the Soviet sortie rate is more like 4 times historical, and shows no sign of declining. But anyway, we'll see it through to the end -- that's what an experiment is for, to see what happens.

[Math Guy]

(Note: The effect of saving and reloading on air mission planning by the AI seems to be confirmed. The save game file does not contain any planning information. So after a reload, before it can issue new attack orders, the AI has to reconstruct its plans from the basic information it has, namely where each unit is, what it is doing, what the enemy is doing, and so on. This appears to take about 24 hours. Missions that are in the air at the moment of saving are not affected, but in a half-dozen tests, new Soviet missions did not start until at least 24 hours had elapsed after a reload. I am guessing that the same was true for all the other AI air forces in the game. Anyone seeing this same phenomenon in other games is invited to comment here.)

Nov 29 39

With the Red Air Force quiet, entrenching and reorganization continued along the wilderness front.

Nov 30 39

One of the heaviest days yet of Soviet air attack, with moderate casualties. No other important developments.

Kajaani (morning) 700 planes, 1 lost, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (morning) 400 planes, 2 lost, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 750 planes, 14 lost
Kajaani (afternoon) 500 planes, 2 lost
Joensuu (afternoon) 1,150 planes, 3 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,450, 22 lost
Total Finnish casualties: 200 to 300

Dec 1 39

Air attack was again light -- 200 raiders at Joensuu losing 2 shot down with no effect. A joint Lithuanian-Soviet communique announced that Lithuania had given in to Soviet demands and become part of the USSR. The total number of divisions facing Viipuri had reached an ominous 31.

The most important development, however, was the arrival of the 12th Division at Kajaani. The 12th was accompanied by a full AA brigade, and this more than doubled the available AA firepower in the town and surrounding area. VII Corps now totaled three divisions.

Soviet reconnaissance must have been more alert than it had been in the case of the 11th Division's arrival a few days earlier, because within hours of the 12th detraining at Kajaani, the enemy columns advancing on the town from several directions were observed to stop. A full day later, they still had not resumed.

Numerous lateral troop movements along the Murmansk rail line were underway, but now the only movement of Soviet forces directly into Finland was a two-pronged attack on Joensuu that had been approaching for more than 10 days now and had still not arrived. Clearly the attack on Kajaani had been called off, at least for the moment, because with the arrival of the 12th the odds were no longer favorable. This was a singular bit of good fortune and the High Command was jubilant. More time to gather our forces, more time for research and development, more time for the West to intervene . . .

Dec 2 39

The bombing started late on the 2nd, with 800 raiders at Viipuri losing 14 of their number and accomplishing nothing. Though observers all along the battlefront remained on the alert, no further raids were spotted.

Around noon, the Parliament was called into an extraordinary special session to hear a report from the Foreign Minister. The German Ambassador and the Military Attache had visited him early that morning to deliver a startling formal proposal, inviting Finland to join the Rome-Berlin Axis.

While debate lasted well into the evening, the outcome was never seriously in doubt. The President, the Defense Council, and the Foreign Minister all recommended that the proposal be rejected, with Finland's thanks, and that a policy of strict neutrality with regard to the larger war be observed.

A reply was drafted for delivery the following morning. That same morning, the first shipments of hundreds of Suomi submachineguns arrived by rail at the rear areas of II, III, IV, V, VI and VIIth Corps, to be distributed to the troops.

Morale had never been higher. The crisis at Kajaani had been averted without a fight, the air war had so far proved tough but endurable, new weapons and new formations were reaching the front lines, and proud Finland had committed herself to "go it alone" rather than violate her principles.

"Bring on the Red Army," some said. "We'll show them how free men fight."

And how they die, the listeners did not have to add.

[Montemurro]

This is a nice one

[Math Guy]

Dec 3 39

Only a single wave of attacks on this day, but with heavy losses to the Finns.

Kajaani (morning) 300 planes, 4 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (morning) 400 planes, 1 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 1,100 planes, 9 shot down, 200 to 300 casualties

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,800, 14 lost
Total Finnish losses: 400 to 500

Dec 4 39

Again only a single wave of attacks, with no losses and heavy consequences to the Red Air Force. After weeks of carefully observing the Soviet formations and seeing no weakening, forward observers on this day were unanimous -- the bomber strengths in particular had fallen, coordination seemed more ragged than before. Was the tide turning?

Kajaani (morning) 300 planes, 7 shot down, no effect
Joensuu (morning) 400 planes, 2 shot down, no effect
Viipuri (morning) 900 planes, 19 shot down, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,600, 26 shot down

Dec 5 39

The Soviets roused themselves to another all-out effort but there was no denying it now -- the constant pounding by Finnish AA was wearing the bombers down. There were more gaps in their ranks than ever before. The fighters were keeping well out of the way of the flak, taking fewer hits but also leaving the bombers vulnerable to concentrated fire.

Kajaani (morning) 400 planes, 5 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (morning) 350 planes, 2 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 1,050 planes, 12 shot down, 100 to 200 casualties

Kajaani (afternoon) 400 planes, 6 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (afternoon) 350 planes, 4 shot down, no effect
Viipuri (afternoon) 1,050 planes, 12 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,600, 41 shot down
Total Finnish losses: 500 to 600

Dec 6 39

For the first time, the Reds resorted to sending unescorted bombers against their targets. The High Command cursed our own lack of fighter cover, but the air massacre was clearly intensifying. Checking the tail numbers of the aircraft attacking, we estimated that the Soviet formations overhead were now almost 150 planes short, losses that had so far not been replaced.

Kajaani (morning) 100 planes, 5 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Joensuu (morning) 750 planes, 1 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 900 planes, 6 shot down, 100 to 200 casualties

Kajaani (afternoon) 450 planes, 6 shot down, no effect
Joensuu (afternoon) 650 planes, 2 shot down, no effect
Viipuri (afternoon) 350 planes, 19 shot down, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,200, 39 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: 300 to 400

Dec 7 39

Again the Soviets made a major effort, but this time our observers reported their formations were at least 200 planes short of full strength.

Kajaani (morning) 550 planes, 1 shot down, 100 to 200 casualties
Joensuu (morning) 350 planes, 3 shot down, no effect
Viipuri (morning) 800 planes, 11 shot down 200 to 300 casualties

Kajaani (afternoon) 550 planes, 5 shot down, no effect
Joensuu (afternoon) 650 planes, 4 shot down, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 2,900, 24 shot down
Total Finnish losses: 400 to 500 casualties

Dec 8 39

The last remaining Soviet ground attack became the focus of Red air support, with only Joensuu hit by multiple raids this day. The losses could not have been worth the meagre results obtained.

Joensuu (morning) 200 planes, 2 shot down, 50 to 100 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 650 planes, 29 shot down, 100 to 200 casualties

Joensuu (afternoon) 350 planes, 4 shot down, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,200, 35 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: 200 to 300

At nightfall, opinion remained divided among the General Staff advisors. For the past several weeks a pessimistic forecast had been circulating, showing that our AA fire was having no effect in wearing down Red raid strength. But a dissident minority had pointed out that each time, the bomber wings had taken slightly worse losses than the fighters. The count of wrecks on the ground, compared with observer counts of raiders, confirmed this.

"If the bombers are worn down enough, they can send all the I-16s they want to fly cover, and it won't matter to us." But were the bombers really being worn down, or was this just a temporary blip, a statistical anomaly?

It seemed as though perhaps the lonely optimists were right, and the Red air power really could be driven back. Certainly the move of the 12th Division with its attached AA brigade to Kajaani had had a dramatic effect on the air battle, and the land battle. The Soviets had halted their drive on the town, and since December 1st, the Reds had lost 41 aircraft from raids there.

The next few days would be crucial. In particular, the 1st Division was about to arrive in Joensuu, reinforcing VI Corps. Would a fourth division in that town persuade the Soviets to give up their planned attack? Were the overstretched bombers still capable of keeping up two sorties per day? We would soon find out.

[Math Guy]

Dec 9 39

The leading elements of the 1st Division arrived at Joensuu at 7:00 am. Preparations had been made to provide the marching columns with temporary air-raid shelters, mainly slit trenches. But they were not needed. Only Viipuri was hit that morning, by a feeble raid of 200 aircraft.

By the time Viipuri was hit again in the afternoon, by a repeat raid of 200, even more amazing news was reaching the High Command via the headquarters of VI Corps. The Soviet advance on Joensuu had stopped!

Viipuri (morning) 200 planes, 14 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Viipuri (afternoon) 200 planes, 18 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 400, 32 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: 50 to 100

Dec 10 39

The optimists among the General Staff advisory team knew they had won their point when the morning of December 10th passed with no air raids anywhere along the front, and no sign of Soviet advances. There were still 25 divisions in Leningrad, 10 opposite Sortavala, a half-dozen opposite Joensuu, 13 near Kajaani, and more in the far north -- but none was marching on Finnish positions. Blocked by a reinforced corps, the Soviets had declined to try to push through the snow-covered forest trails to take Joensuu. This was amazing news, and throughout the day the Staff worked to confirm it. But it appeared to be true.

In the afternoon a weak raid of about 150 planes hit Viipuri and suffered the worst percentage losses of any raid in the war so far -- 16 planes. The raid broke off early, something the Red Air Force had not done before, and another sign of their weakening resolve. No damage was done.

Dec 11 39

The air defense coordinator at Viipuri reported a medium-sized raid that morning, 350 planes, which was punished and sent on its way leaving 15 wrecks and a few casualties. In the afternoon, Joensuu was hit by the same group of raiders and they lost another 6 planes, accomplishing nothing.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 700, 21 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: 50 to 100

Dec 12 39

As if unwilling to abandon the struggle completely, but lacking the forces to carry it on, fewer than 100 unescorted Red SB-2s appeared over Viipuri in the afternoon. 16 were shot down, and no casualties were reported on the ground.

In just a few days, the Soviet bombing campaign had declined from more than 3,000 sorties per day to a few hundred.

The cost in Finnish lives had been high. In four weeks of bombing there had been more than 1,300 dead, and a similar number of severely wounded. Trucks, guns, and equipment sufficient to equip at least half a division had been destroyed. But the Soviets had lost a total of 483 planes, and more importantly, had apparently lost their nerve.

Finland was holding on.

[Montemurro]

Reading your AAR, makes me wish there was somekind of 'peace event', where the Finnish got to keep their territory

But, it's still very entertaining

[Math Guy]

I thought "Sue for Peace" would return you to the status quo. The Russians might not be willing yet, but you never know . . .

[Math Guy]

(Side note: Long ago I fought a campaign as Ethiopia, and managed to get Italy to agree to peace. The technique was actually very similar to what I did here. I kept a close watch on where the AI decided to attack, and each time rushed enough troops to that province to either convince the Italians to stop their advance short, or give them a bloody nose. After a couple of months of stalemate, I tried Sue for Peace and Italy agreed to return to the status quo ante. I'm hoping to try that here but first I think I'll have to actually repel a ground invasion or two.)

On the evening of December 12th, the Finnish High Command gathered for a staff conference. By that time, amazement and relief had given way to an urgently renewed sense of mission. Mannerheim asked the question for everyone: "Very well, gentlemen. Assuming it is real, what shall we do with this gift of time that the Soviets have given us?"

The first issue: what to do with the weapons assembly line at Tampere. Having fulfilled its delivery quota for the new Suomi submachineguns, the Tampere factory was asking for a government commitment to one of two new projects.

Either the factory would begin turning out antitank mines, or it would start work on a licensed British howitzer design of about 87mm. The critical question was whether increased offensive firepower was more important, or additional protection for the troops.

The handful of optimists among the General Staff advisory team had seen their credibility soar in recent days, and were invited to speak before the High Command on the options. "Most of us favor developing our offensive power. The Soviets are insane, they march in and out of Leningrad on their bizarre maneuvers every few days, leaving the city practically unguarded. We could rush it, then use it as a bargaining chip. End the war in return for having Leningrad back. For that we need artillery."

Mannerheim was silent, along with the rest of the room. Eventually he leaned forward. "You're aware that Leningrad contains almost as large a population as all of Finland."

"With respect, sir, that's why it's such a good bargaining chip --"

"The Soviet demands are for one seventh of Finland. You're not talking about getting one bargaining chip, you're talking about raising the ante."

General Ohquist spoke next. "They're barbarians -- excuse me, Field Marshal, I'm not speaking of Russians in general, but the Soviets. They don't recognize civilized constraints. No one thinks they will settle for one seventh of Finland."

"So we mean to impress them with our seriousness by imitating their methods? Shell Leningrad, fight block by block and destroy the Hermitage Museum and the rest of it?"

It appeared no one wished to dispute with Mannerheim on this point. After another long pause, General Pajari, commander of VII Corps, cleared his throat. "It is war, Field Marshal. We can fight on their soil or on ours. It is not unreasonable to propose fighting on theirs."

Pajari, whose troops at Kajaani had suffered the heaviest losses so far, was not deterred by Mannerheim's cold stare. "If you order me to stay inside our borders, sir, naturally I will obey. But troops fight far better if they understand the reason. Just holding a line, week after week, and being bombed, when we could put the Reds on the run --"

Mannerheim nodded. "I understand your point. But this is not, in fact, a war. Not in the usual sense. We are bargaining, gentlemen. The Soviets want territory, we are making them pay in blood. At some point they may decide the price is too high. Until they do we cannot afford to go changing the rules of the game.

"The factory at Tampere will work on defensive weapons -- starting with the new land mines, and then the 30mm Bofors AA gun license. We are short of artillery but we are shorter still of Finns -- we must keep as many alive as possible."

With that the meeting broke up, to resume the next day.

[Math Guy]

Germany's campaign against France had remained stalled for three weeks now, holding only Metz and Belgium but making no progress elsewhere.

Italy's invasion in the south had swept all the way to the Spanish border and was now turning north toward Paris. The British had however eliminated the Italian pocket near Sidi Barrani and were well entrenched in Tobruk, and Italian East Africa was nearing collapse as British forces were on the outskirts of Addis Ababa.

14-20 Nov 39
9,450 Soviet sorties, 76 aircraft shot down
up to 1,400 Finnish casualties

21-27 Nov 39
9,850 Soviet sorties, 96 aircraft shot down
up to 1,500 Finnish casualties

28 Nov-4 Dec 39
11,000 Soviet sorties, 103 aircraft shot down
up to 1,100 Finnish casualties

5-11 Dec 39
12,150 Soviet sorties, 208 aircraft shot down
up to 2,000 Finnish casualties

[Stanislavski]

Nice game.

[Math Guy]

Dec 13 39

After the catastrophic raid on Viipuri on the 12th, no Red aircraft dared Finnish skies on the 13th. "Too busy patching holes!" was the general conclusion among the AA gunners of VII Corps, who organized scavenger hunts to collect the machine guns from dozens of crashed fighters and mount them on crude pintles turned out by a local blacksmith.

A somewhat more sober observation came from our small but active radio-intercept intelligence group, concerning the movement of the Soviet 76th Air Division to Novgorod. Until now the 76th had been kept in reserve near Tallinn, taking no part in the past four weeks' fighting. This signalled a higher level of commitment.

Dec 14 39

Soviet raiders appeared above Viipuri in significant numbers -- close to 450 -- but accomplished nothing and were driven off with the loss of 18 planes. They returned in the afternoon and suffered a further 20 lost. At least 9 of the wrecks had identification numbers placing them with the 76th Air Division. They had had a very bad first day in the war.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 850, 38 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: none

Dec 15 39

A brief sortie by our sub flotilla (driven in within hours by the increasingly active Soviet navy) brought new short-range radio intercept data showing that more than two-thirds of the Red Air Force was now located in Novgorod or Leningrad, and that a full 35 divisions faced II Corps and III Corps across the Isthmus.

The failure by the Soviets to simply surge into Viipuri with maximum force was baffling. We were also receiving reports of major troop movements via Murmansk into the wilderness to the east of that city. What purpose this served, no one could determine.

Meanwhile in the south, the Soviets were apparently still reorganizing, for no raids were mounted on this day.

Dec 16 39

This would be the first attempt to mount multiple raids in morning and afternoon since Dec 7th. The weather had been clear for days (and would remain so until Christmas). The results were amazing -- not a single Finnish life lost, and a record FIFTY raiders destroyed. As usual, the Red bombers took the worst of it.

Viipuri (morning) 400 planes, 18 lost
Kajaani (morning) 300 planes, 7 lost

Viipuri (afternoon) 400 planes, 19 lost
Kajaani (afternoon) 300 planes, 6 lost

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,400, 50 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: none

Dec 17 39

Judging correctly that the Reds would need a day's rest after the brutal lesson they had received yesterday, the High Command took the unusual step of inviting foreign journalists into the immediate rear of the Mannerheim Line. They were treated to a tour of several aircraft salvage yards, filled with row upon row of I-16 fuselages, stripped of instruments and weapons, waiting to be melted down. The larger SB-2s were not so easy to transport using sled teams, but had been photographed in place and had their tail numbers removed. Even allowing for the many planes that were lost beneath the lake ice or somewhere in the trackless forests, the sight was impressive.

While figures like Churchill had rallied to our cause from the start, Stalin's foreign admirers and supporters (sadly, among them many Western intellectuals) had been saying for weeks that Finnish claims of destroying hundreds of Red aircraft were absurd exaggerations by a bunch of farmers and reindeer herders led by a reactionary clique of emigre Whites, that the "progressive people's army" was making steady progress in suppressing our fascistic regime, and that Mannerheim's policy of not allowing journalists near the front was intended to conceal the much lower numbers of actual wrecks.

We hoped that our frank display of the evidence would put an end to these libels. They did.

Among newspapers friendly to the Finnish cause, the headlines read: "Fortress Finland Sweeps Red Air Force From Sky".

And among the periodicals openly or not so openly favoring a "workers' state" under the leadership of the Communist Party, there were headlines like these:

"New Evidence of British & French Interference in Baltic Affairs"

"Secret Antiaircraft Weapons Tested by Foreign Powers in Finland"

"Swedish 'Lightning Guns' Burn Red Bombers with Electricity"

"Embattled Soviet Air Force Facing Hundreds of German Fighters at Secret Finnish Bases"

An indignant aide reportedly brought the resulting stories to the attention of Mannerheim, who smiled (a rarity for the Baron) and replied, "Now you may understand a little better why I did not invite the journalists when they first asked, back in November."

Dec 18 39

Stung by the unfavorable stories racing out overnight by wire, the Soviets sent a single attack group in two tentative strikes along the wilderness border.

Kajaani (morning) 400 planes, 4 lost

Joensuu (afternoon) 400 planes, 6 lost

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 800, 10 lost
Total Finnish losses: none.

Four of the ten planes downed this day were bombers. A captured SB-2 gunner, fortunate enough to parachute to safety before his aircraft impacted just south of Joensuu, remarked that at least half the gunners and navigators in his squadron were air officer cadets who had been yanked from training schools near Rostov and flown north a week earlier. The strain on the Soviet air replacement system was beginning to show.

[Pkunzipper]

Great AAR!!

I like very much the way you use statistics and number to describe the progress of the war!

[Math Guy]

The staff meeting resumed on the 13th to consider several additional questions. Chief among them: how to create a trap for the Red ground forces.

It was the respected General Pajari, known as 'Salamander' Pajari by his troops, for touring entrenchments while Soviet bombs burst on all sides, who expressed the paradox.

"In retrospect, we might have been better off not reinforcing at Joensuu and Kajaani . . . We couldn't have known that the Soviets would fold so easily, without a fight. But if we had let them into those places, bloodied them then given some ground, they'd be hurting now. It's impossible for a foreign army to feed itself properly over a forest trail. They'd be losing hundreds on the sick list each day."

Mannerheim nodded. "And if we're wrong about their road-building skills or their determination, they also might have broken through to Oulu. Not such a favorable outcome in that case. But go on."

"We think the reason for the delay in the south is because the narrow front doesn't allow more than twenty divisions or so to attack effectively. Even at 3 to 1 the Stavka doesn't seem to like the odds. They tried to soften us up with bombing, it didn't work. Hence we have a stalemate."

"So . . . ?"

"So we propose a partial withdrawal. Take III Corps out of the line and see if the apparent improvement in odds encourages the Reds to attack II Corps."

"Planning all the while to rush back with those three divisions plus the strategic reserve. Interesting. And very risky. Have you estimated what our losses will be during the first few days?"

"Yes. All the figures are in the report of the General Staff advisory team. We think the risk is tolerable. But, Field Marshal, the problem is that the present weather won't last forever. Once spring comes we will be very vulnerable. You said this is about making the Reds pay in blood. They need to start paying now, not sometime in March. Otherwise there will be no incentive for them to come to terms before the good weather."

Mannerheim considered. "I will look at the report. You may make some logistical preparations. Set up temporary camps in the rear for III Corps to move to."

[Math Guy]

In fact, however, Mannerheim never approved the plan to lure the Soviets into attacking the Isthmus. He waited a week, looking over numbers submitted by the planning group, then he waited another week. He would not say why. As he often did, the commander-in-chief kept his thoughts to himself.

By the end of the second week, the march of events had made all such plans irrelevant. Whatever the newspapers might say, the Soviets were not done with Finland.

Dec 19 39

Soviet raiding increased somewhat in intensity, with multiple raids morning and afternoon.

Kajaani (morning) 300 planes, 7 lost, no effect
Joensuu (morning) 400 planes, 3 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Kajaani (afternoon) 400 planes, 6 lost, no effect
Joensuu (afternoon) 300 planes, 6 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,400, 22 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: 50 to 100

Dec 20 39

For a time it seemed possible that the Red air offensive was about to resume in full fury, but observers assured the High Command that these were the same ragged formations that had been driven off a week earlier, only hastily reinforced and patched-up.

Kajaani (morning) 700 planes, 5 lost, 100 to 200 casualties
Viipuri (morning) 400 planes, 15 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Joensuu (afternoon) 400 planes, 6 lost, no effect
Viipuri (afternoon) 400 planes, 20 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,900, 46 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: 200 to 300

Dec 21 39

Red air activity was predictably minimal this day, after their thrashing by Finnish AA on the 20th.

Viipuri (morning) 200 planes, 16 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Joensuu (afternoon) 200 planes, 6 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 400, 22 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: 50 to 100

Dec 22 39

The Reds continued to switch from target to target without threatening any of them on the ground, or achieving any decisive concentration of effort.

Journalists who had so far filed endless stories from the comfort of their hotels in Helsinki now discovered a new hobby, picking over aircraft scrap yards and exchanging their advanced theories of air warfare.

Viipuri (morning) 600 planes, 15 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Joensuu (afternoon) 400 planes, 6 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,000, 21 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: 50 to 100

Dec 23 39

There had been little snow so far this winter, the brief intervals of daylight were clear and crisp. The winter solstice had just passed and the days had begun to lengthen again.

Another day of minor raids left the main front untouched. While the Kajaani garrison was busy, the High Command and many of the troops along the Mannerheim Line began thinking about Christmas furloughs and their families, rather than the ongoing war.

Kajaani (morning) 300 planes, 7 lost, no effect

Kajaani (afternoon) 300 planes, 7 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 600, 14 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: none

Dec 24 39

Christmas Eve. While technically still on high alert, many frontline units increased the proportion of troops on leave, and reduced patrolling to a minimum in anticipation of the holiday. Across the static fronts, indications were that the Soviets were doing the same.

Viipuri (morning) 400 planes, 17 lost, 50 to 100 casualties

Joensuu (afternoon) 350 planes, 6 lost, no effect

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 750, 23 planes lost
Total Finnish casualties: 50 to 100

Dec 25 39

Christmas in Helsinki was a time of cautious optimism. As darkness fell in early afternoon, the foreign embassies were blacked-out with the same thoroughness as all Finnish buildings -- but as nearly six weeks had passed without a single Soviet air attack on the city, few believed tonight would be the night that raids began. The news from the Western front continued to mesmerize, as the Italians had driven north almost to the Rhine, and now two Canadian corps had landed to reinforce the French. The stunning British victory at Sidi Barrani was also widely discussed, although several weeks had passed since Italian resistance in the pocket had collapsed.

But discussions among the diplomats and their guests, whether at the German embassy, or at the British embassy, soon turned back to the topic closest at hand: What would it take for the Soviets to admit they were not up to the task of conquering Finland, and come to terms? Whose side would Stalin come in on -- with his new ally Hitler, against the hectoring democracies who opposed his policies in Finland? And if the Red Army was so easily repelled, did anyone want them as allies?

The scene at the Brazilian consulate was somewhat different. Field Marshal Mannerheim had resisted repeated social invitations from the German ambassador for six long weeks. The British had extended similar offers and been similarly refused. But seeing the quiet that extended over the wilderness and Isthmus fronts, and the fading tempo of the air war, the Baron was apparently content to spend a few hours celebrating the holiday.

Two days earlier Mannerheim's aide had approached the Brazilian consul and asked if the commander-in-chief might make a brief appearance "on neutral ground, as it were". The Brazilians had instantly agreed, and the consulate's modest party was rapidly if discreetly transformed into THE event of the night. It was understood that no active combatants in the wider war could attend, each side having its own parties, but the rest of neutral Europe and the world soon found excuses to alter their plans. As the Brazilian consul resided in a tiny brownstone with a staff of two, having two hundred distinguished guests suddenly descend on them required prodigious feats of organization.

It had been made clear in advance that there would be no discussion of the war situation. Mannerheim's daily staff lunches were already famous for being rich in cigar smoking and masculine conversation of no consequence. It was a measure of the respect many now held for Finland's commander-in-chief that the diplomatic corps did not even attempt to talk about the war behind his back.

The food was in fact excellent, and for over an hour the Field Marshal regaled his listeners with stories about his exploratory journeys on behalf of the Czar, traveling with a survey team on horseback from Turkestan to Peking and eventually to Lhasa, Tibet, where among other things he taught the Dalai Lama to shoot with a pistol.*

It was approaching eight in the evening when an aide, waiting for a suitable pause in the discussion, caught the commander-in-chief's eye. Mannerheim nodded, almost imperceptibly, and after another minute or two, excused himself from his circle of companions.

The two men stepped outside, into the blackness of Helsinki's wartime streets, and Mannerheim carefully closed the door behind them. The corporal and the car that had brought him were standing in the street, engine running. The aide had come in a motorcycle-sidecar combination, which also stood at the foot of the consulate steps. Two Helsinki policemen, assigned to the embassy for security, completed the scene. Mannerheim merely glanced at them.

"Where?"

"Sortavala. In 48 hours or less."

____________

* Yes, Mannerheim really did this. See A Frozen Hell: The Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40 (1991), William R. Trotter, p. 24.